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Abstract 
A backlash against women’s rights emerged in post-revolutionary Egypt. This paper 
argues that one of the reasons is the fact that former President Mubarak, his wife and son were 
the key decision makers when it came to women’s rights. These decisions were reflected in the 
media so that women’s rights came to be associated with government policy personalized around 
the first lady. The paper demonstrates that the backlash did not emerge suddenly after Mubarak 
was ousted from power, but that dissent against Mubaraks’ decisions pertaining to women was 
prevalent in the media long before the 25th of January revolution. The paper builds on a number 
of theories. One of them is whether the notion of personal authoritarianism was applicable to the 
former President’s wife and son and not just to the President himself. It also takes a new element 
into consideration: the media, and will analyze the drawbacks of women’s rights as addressed by 
an authoritarian regime.  
 
Keywords: women’s rights and authoritarianism; media treatment of women’s rights; backlash 
against women’s rights  
 
Introduction  
 Even though Egyptian women actively participated in the 25th of January revolution, they 
did not gain more rights in post- revolutionary Egypt. On the contrary, a backlash against 
women’s rights emerged in the form of attempts and/or concrete steps to repeal the laws 
pertaining to women that were introduced or amended by the Mubarak regime. This paper aims 
to explain why this backlash took place by arguing that one of the main reasons is the identity of 
the key decision makers concerning women’ rights under the Mubarak regime, couple with 
media treatment of these decision, and the role played by those behind the scenes.  
The first section of the paper identifies the key decision makers, the second analyzes 
media treatment of their role in these decisions, and the third section demonstrates that societal 
dissent against women’s rights was prevalent during Mubarak’s reign, but only after he was 
ousted from power it culminated into an outright backlash against women’s rights.  
The paper builds on a number of theories. One is Maye Kassem’s (2004) argument that 
the former Egyptian regime was personal authoritarian, whereby all branches of government are 
loyal to the President. This paper tests whether the theory is also applicable to the former first 
lady and Gamal Mubarak, the former President’s younger son, and not just the former President. 
In addition, it builds on the drawbacks of an authoritarian regime addressing women’s rights 
identified by Emma Murphy (2003). Murphy examines the impact of an authoritarian 
government’s approach to women’s rights not only society’s perception of women and their 
rights, but also on media treatment of women’s rights. This paper states that the former Egyptian 
regime created a similar organization called the National Council for Women (NCW). Both 
Murphy and Melinda Adams (2007) identify some of the problems of having a women’s 
organization created by an authoritarian regime, but they did not look into whether or not they 
identity of the person who heads the organization and the level of popularity of the authoritarian 
regime in power can have an impact on media treatment of women’s rights. The paper will build 
on their findings by looking into this issue.  
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Background Information 
This section will provide a brief overview and some background information about the 
Mubarak regime engaging in various legal changes and other measures pertaining to women’s 
rights. In 2000, a new law that granted women unprecedented divorce rights was introduced. By 
virtue of this law called khula, a woman can obtain swift, unilateral and irrevocable divorce, 
provided that she return her dowry and relinquish all of her financial rights. Khula is an Arabic 
term that means remove or get rid of. Its usage in this context connotes that a woman can easily 
get rid of her husband, and this term was rather offensive to Egyptian men. Three years later, the 
Egyptian law on nationality was amended in a manner that was more favorable to women. It 
used to allow for the children of an Egyptian man and a non-Egyptian woman to obtain the 
Egyptian nationality. The children’s mother was also entitled to it two years after the marriage 
took place. However, the children of an Egyptian woman married to a non-Egyptian man, as well 
as the children’s father, were not allowed to obtain Egyptian nationality. In 2003, the law was 
amended to allow those children – but not their father – to obtain the Egyptian nationality. In the 
same year, Mubarak appointed the very first female judge in Egypt (Leila, 2009).  In 2005, the 
child custody law was amended. Prior to the amendment the law stipulated that boys remained in 
their mothers’ custody until the age of 10, while girls remained in their mothers’ custody until 
the age of 12. Moreover, at a specified age child custody was automatically transferred to the 
father. The law was amended so that both boys and girls would remain in their others’ custody 
till the age of 15, then they would get to choose with which parent they wished to live (Leila, 
2005). Finally, in 2009 a women’s parliamentary quota was adopted. Other legal changes which 
took place under the Mubarak regime pertaining to women were to reintroduce a law that 
stipulates that a man can be sentenced to prison if he does not pay his ex-wife the alimony 
(NCW, 2004), to cancel the law that stated that women need their husband’s permission in order 
to travel (Kandil, 2006), and to amend the pension law to allow men to receive the pension of 
their deceased wives.  
 
Identifying the Main Policy Makers in Decisions Pertaining to Women’s Rights under the 
Mubarak Regime  
I will examine statements made by three different women to gain an understanding of 
who the main players were when decisions pertaining to women’s rights were made under the 
Muabrak regime. The first woman in Nehal Shoukry, a journalist and former duty editor in chif 
of Al Ahram, and a member of the Women’s Secretariat of the former ruling National 
Democratic Party (NDP) and NCW’s Political Participation Committee. The second woman is 
Iman Baibers, the President of the Board of Trustees of the Association for the Development and 
Enhancement of Women (ADEW). ADEW is an NGO that primarily works with female-headed 
households living in shanty towns. The third woman is Nehad Abu El-Komsan President of the 
Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights (ECWR) and chair of its Board of Directors. ECWR’s 
main concern is supporting Egyptian women in their struggle to obtain all of their rights and 
equality. Finally, I will examine NCW’s role in addressing women’s rights.  
The National Council for Women (NCW) was established by a Presidential decree in the 
year 2000 and it is affiliated with the President of the Republic. Former first lady Suzanne 
Mubarak used to be the acting President of NCW, and followed the Council’s work almost on a 
daily basis. Her role was to nominate the Secretary General of the Council, approve the 
composition of the Standing Committees of the Council and nominate the coordinator and the 
alternate coordinator for each committee after the approval of the Board of the Council, 
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supervise the … [council’s] work with the assistance of the Secretary General [and any other 
member of her choosing], invite the Council to hold regular or exceptional meetings [and] invite 
any of the Committees to meet [at a date and time of her choosing], … approve the composition 
of the Council’s delegation abroad, .. approve the proposed general budget and the final financial 
statement of the Council after approval by the Board of the Council, delegate anyone she chooses 
for conducting research … [related to] the objective and mandate of the council, … approve the 
composition of the Branches of the Council [and] approve the composition of Ad-hoc 
Committees of the Council.  
Therefore, the first lady was almost in full control of NCW, and was involved in the 
intrinsic details of its workings. One of NCW’s committees is the Legislative Committee.  It 
aims to examine laws, regulations and decrees related to women, and to propose any amendment 
deemed necessary to express opinions on draft laws, regulations, and decrees related to the 
objective of NCW [and] to follow up on the enforcement of laws, regulations and decrees to 
ensure that they live up to the principle] of gender equality, as stipulated in the Egyptian 
Constitution. In others, NCW’s mandate grants it the power to play an integral role in changing 
laws pertaining to women. Since NCW was run like a one (wo)man show, the first lady was 
entitled to change laws.  
Shoukry’s statements shed some more light on the role played by the former first lady in 
introducing a specific law pertaining to women’s rights.  
For many years the Women’s Secretariat [of the NDP] produced several reports about the 
need to introduce something along the lines of what later became the khula law. The reports were 
then passed on to the Secretary General of the NDP, but the leaders of the party were 
embarrassed and were reluctant to make that decision until Suzanne Mubarak supported this 
cause and after that it was implemented. 
 Meanwhile, Abu El Komsan revealed that the former first lady played an integral role in 
changing another law in a manner that benefits women: 
NCW has achieved a lot in a short period of time. … NCW is the one who changed the 
nationality law, NGOs worked on it for 10 years but it was NCW that managed to change it, but 
not in the manner we were calling for. 
If the law was changed in way that differed from those called by women’s NGOs, it 
indicates that they did not have a say in the decision itself. The former first lady’s role was not 
confined to changing and introducing laws. For Shoukry, “appointing women as judges was the 
result of efforts by the first lady … the Women’s Secretariat [of the NDP] … did not play any 
role whatsoever in this issue and the NDP as a whole had nothing to do with it.” 
Despite this, it is wrong to assume that the first lady was the sole decision maker. 
According to Shoukry, the [NDP’s] Women’s Secretariat sought to change the nationality law 
for many long years but the NDP refused to even consider it. Things only changed after Safwat 
al Sherif became Secretary General of the NDP and the Policies Committee was formed in 2002 
headed by Gamal Mubarak i.e. young people with a new vision joined the Party. They sponsored 
changing the nationality law. We also owe the first lady because she exerted a lot of effort in this 
regard and at the end of the day, we owe the President for responding to the demands of 
Egyptian mothers. 
In other words, both the former President and Gamal Mubarak played integral roles in 
changing the law of nationality. The importance of their roles toward changes pertaining to 
women’s rights is clarified even further by examining how the women’s parliamentary quota was 
adopted.  
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In 2005, the first presidential election took place in Egypt, and former President Mubarak 
was the NDP candidate. His electoral program included taking the necessary measures to 
increase women’s parliamentary quota would be considered during a joint session of the 
People’s Assembly and Shoura Council. Therefore, the former President’s direct involvement 
was necessary to adopt the women’s parliamentary quota. Furthermore, according to Shoukry, 
“the NDP Policies Committee which is headed by Gamal Mubarak formed a working group” to 
decide which type of quota would be adopted and how it would be implemented.  
Clearly, when it came to decisions pertaining to women’s rights the main key policy 
makers were the former President, the former first lady and their son Gamal. Perhaps Baibers 
summed it up very well by saying:  
Who is going to change the law? Hosni Mubarak. If you do not like him, go ahead and 
establish a political party and change him. But until he is changed, I will beseech him to change 
the nationality law. … On Orbit [television station] I said Mr. President, these are your children, 
please do not let them down. Who stood up on the 18th of September 2003 and said we will 
change the nationality law? Hosni Mubarak. You have to utilize the tactics that will result in 
achieving your goals. … Suzanne, Gamal and Hosni [Mubarak] are the ones who change things 
regardless of whether or not you work on the media. You have to get your message across to 
them and be persistent. … It is very easy for Suzanne Mubarak to change a law.  
 
Media Treatment of the Role of the Mubaraks in Decisions Pertaining to Women’s Rights 
 The adoption of a women’s parliamentary quota was the Muabrak’s most recent – and 
also their last – decision pertaining to women’s rights. It will be taken as a case study in media 
treatment in both newspapers and talk shows. The newspapers are the government owned Al 
Ahram or ‘The Pyramids’ and the privately owned Al Masry Al Youm or ‘The Egyptian Today.’ 
The talk shows are 48 Sa’a or 48 Hours and 90 Dekika or ’90 Minutes’, both of which are aired 
on the privately owned channel Al Mehwar, in addition to Al Beit Betak or ‘Make Yourself at 
Home’, which used to be aired on two government owned channels. Government owned media 
outlets were mouthpieces for the Mubarak regime, while privately owned media was largely 
controlled by the former regime so that any criticism against it or its policies was allowed to a 
certain extent to create a fake pluralistic media environment.  
The media was hypocritical toward former President Mubarak’s role in adopting a quota 
for women in parliament. There were countless opinion columns in Al Ahram that contained 
praise for the former President. For example, Abo Imara argued that women remained 
underrepresented in parliament until President Mubarak placed increasing representation at the 
top of his priorities (Abo Imara, 2009). Members of the former ruling party also made similar 
statements. For example, in the episode of the talk show 48 Sa’a aired on Al Mehwar June 26, 
2009, former member of the NDP Ibitssam Abo Rihab said: “I would like to thank the President 
for supporting women throughout, and for adopting the women’s parliamentary quota.” It is not 
surprising in any way that such statements were made by people affiliated with the regime, but it 
is significant in any way that such statements were made by people affiliated with the regime, 
but it is significant that members of the opposition acted in a similar fashion. For example, in the 
episode of the talk show 90 Dekika aired on the November 3, 2008, on Al Mehwar, Nehad 
Soliman, head of the Women’s Committee of the opposition Egyptian Arab Socialist Party said: 
“We are pleased with the quota and we would like to thank his Excellency the President, but the 
type of quota which was adopted focuses on quantity not quality … female members of the NDP 
will end up winning all of the 56 seats.” 
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Finally, there were several news stories in Al Ahram reporting on the President holding 
meetings with senior members of the regime to discuss various matters related to adopting the 
women’s parliamentary quota. An example is an article entitled “Mubarak Reviews the proposed 
Law to Empower Women and [Ensure that they are] Represented in the People’s Assembly: The 
Proposed [Law] Reflects the President’s Concern for Women’s Political and Economic Rights” it 
was about a meeting between President Mubarak and several high-ranking government officials 
where they discussed a draft law to increase women’s representation in parliament (El Masry, 
2009).  
 The role played by Gamal Mubarak in the adoption of the women’s parliamentary quota 
also received some media coverage, largely consisting of news stories in Al Ahram. For example, 
an article entitled “In a Meeting off the NDP’s Higher Policies Committee A Sherif: Increasing 
Women’s Parliamentary Representation is A Step towards Political Reform and Fulfills the 
President’s Promise” stated that the NDP Policies Committee meeting discussed details 
pertaining to the women’s parliamentary quota, such as how many seats would be allocated for 
women. The story included an extremely long quota from Gamal Mubarak (Shoukry, 2009). 
 But things were rather different when it came to the first lady, especially in the privately 
owned media. She was indirectly and negatively referred to in association with the women’s 
parliamentary quota. For example, in an opinion column entitled “Women’s Society” and 
published in Al Masry Al Youm, El Deramali reports: 
I support women’s political participation in principle and I believe that it could be  by 
adopting electoral lists … NCW … and the 16,000 [women’s] NGOs which are foreign funded 
implemented a foreign agenda under the banner of empowering women. … I will sue the law on 
the grounds that it is unconstitutional because … women now rule the country … through NCW 
… and they now have [these] parliamentary seats … they incur illegal benefits from these posts 
while inflicting a lot of harm on society (El Deremali, 2009).  
NCW did not run the country. Far from it, but it was an institution with considerable 
power, simply because it was headed by the former first lady. The writer’s exaggeration of its 
powers as well as his unsubstantiated accusation that women incur illegal benefits are a 
manifestation of the societal dissent against women’s rights which will be addressed in the next 
section.  
 Another example of the unfavorable indirect references to the former first lady from the 
same newspaper is an interview with Mohamed El Omda, member of the free Constitutional 
Party. In the story, he argues that “positive discrimination” is a meaningless and contradictory 
term … Egyptian women are not in the least interested in politics … What kind of rights do they 
not have and how come people claim that women do not play a role in the decision making 
process when every single government official has to be very hypocritical when it comes to 
women and has to speak very highly of women and their role all the time. … having a vision is 
very different from adopting policies to please important local figures [i.e. the former first lady] 
(Khalil, 2009).  
The writer argues that government officials are hypocritical when it comes to women 
because the former first lady used to sponsor women’s rights. Therefore, they did not sin in order 
to please her. It is important to note that the former first lady was criticized in the media for 
playing a role in the adoption of the women’s parliamentary quota, whereas the former President 
and Gamal were not. The reason behind this is that for more than a decade the media provided 
extensive coverage of NCW activities under the auspices of the first lady. In the words of Abu El 
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Komsan, “when you [a women’s NGO] cooperate with NCW all of the credit goes to NCW 
because the first lady is NCW’s President, and because the media will focus on it.”  
It was not only the extensive coverage, but also the type of coverage. At the first lady’s 
request news about NCW used to be published in the governments page and not in the women’s 
page of Al Ahram because she did not want her name to appear next to stories about make-up and 
fashion, but next to stories about ministries. This is the status she wanted NCW to have. 
Therefore, women’s rights became directly associated with the persona of the former first lady. 
In addition, since stories about NCW were either published next to stories about ministries, or 
covered by television alongside the former President’s and Gamal’s actions, women’s rights 
came to be associated with government policy.  
 
Ramifications of Policies in Decisions Pertaining to Women’s Rights  
Sakr (2004) argues that media treatment of women both reflects and reinforces societal 
views of women. I argue that linking women’s rights to the Mubaraks led to societal dissent 
while the regime lasted, and after it was ousted dissent escalated into an outright backlash against 
women’s rights. Anisati Sadati or ‘Ladies and Gentlemen,’ is a weekly program aired on the 
privately owned channel Dream TV, and Sa’et Zaman or ‘An Hour’, is a daily program that used 
to be aired owned channel Egyptian Satellite Channel. On Thursdays it used to address women’s 
rights. A final media outlet is the leftist magazine Roe El Youssef.  
While Mubarak was still in power, societal dissent was reflected in the media in three 
different forms. The first on was sexist and hostile comments about women. For example, in the 
episode of 90 Dekika aired on June 17, 2009, Mohamed Helmi, the editor in chief of caricature 
magazine and a writer in the government owned Al Akhbar or ‘The News’ newspaper, had this to 
say:  
 
Helmi: Several women have previously won parliamentary elections in a manner 
that I greatly admire … male journalists voted for the female ones who ran for the 
journalists’ syndicate. …   
Presenter: What do you think of the women’s parliamentary quota? 
Helmi: I may disagree with the issue of quota, metafahina el kota [men are 
overworked because of women]. I do not think women can play a role in politics. 
They can play a role in other fields such as services, civil society, women 
metafahina el kota [men are overworked because of women], as if that were not 
enough. What do women want from parliament anyway? 
Presenter: Do you support an all-male parliament? 
Helmi: No, I don’t but I am against the women’s parliamentary quota.  
 
Helmi is not against women’s political participation, but curiously, he makes hostile 
comments about women. In addition, the use of the non-Arabic term quota led him – and many 
others for that matter – to associate it with an Arabic term pronounced in a similar manner. This 
term is used in the saying tafhan el kota which means that someone is overworked. Helmi used it 
twice to make a derogatory comment, and so did many other men in other media outlets.  
Similar comments were made in the government owned media. The following example is 
from the talk show Al Beit Betak. In the episode aired on June 1, 2009, some of the questions and 
comments made by the presenter, Khairy Ramadan, were insulting to women. 
“Did the former female members of parliament play a positive role?” 
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“How will NCW … convince voters that women will be capable of opening an office to 
meet up with people, go to police stations to release people from jail and be available [to attend 
to people’s needs] in the middle of the night?” also, a male caller-into the program argued that in 
some countries quotas for men have been introduced to protect men from women. The presenter 
said to him “don’t you worry, similar measures will eventually be necessary in Egypt.” 
The second form of dissent reflected in the media is the notion that the Mubarak regime 
was busy taking away rights from men and giving them to women. One of the episodes of 
Anisati Sadati contained a discussion on how men entrap their wives. The speaker was a male 
psychiatrist and marriage consultant. A segment of the discussion went as follows: 
 
Consultant: In recent years, due to calls for liberating women, as if they were 
occupied and colonized … women have attained freedom at the expense of men’s 
rights. … if I ask my wife to do something and she does it … there will be no 
need for me to get uptight. But if I am in a situation in which my wife disobeys 
my orders, challenges me, oppresses me and if we do not get along she can leave 
the marital home, divorce me and use the khula law to get rid of me. This is 
oppression that men are now subjected to due to mishandling the male-female 
relationship ... Since you [women] overdid it in obtaining some rights that should 
have been mine, I was forced to give up these rights for you, then I will deprive of 
other rights.   
 
In this example, the speaker argues that the Mubarak regime took away rights from men 
and gave them to women and he cites the khula law as an example.  
This attitude was also to be found in government-owned media. For example, the episode 
of Sa’et Zaman aired on January 15, 2009 was about a program administered by United Nations 
Development Fund for Women [UNIFEM] to foster equal opportunities within companies in 
Egypt. The project’s main aim was to ensure that companies do not discriminate against 
employees while appointing or promoting them, primarily on the basis of gender. During the 
discussion, the speakers mentioned that the training program consists of several stages. They 
always ensure that the first stage is administered by a man because they are concerned that if the 
first trainee is a woman, than the employees may dismiss her and anything she says on the 
grounds that she is a woman who is there to provide women with rights at the expense of men.  
The dissent against women’s rights is no secret to those who support and are trying to 
further women’s rights. Thus, they are on the defensive the whole time and they end up 
apologizing for addressing women’s rights in the media. For example, in the episode of Sa’et 
Zaman aired on December 11, 2008, towards the end of the introduction the presenter said: 
I would like to stress that when we address any issue we are not biased to one side or the 
other, even though the program is concerned with women’s issues … However, we are objective 
in presenting [different views]. We are not biased towards women and against men, nor are we 
biased towards men against women. At the end of the day, we want to arrive at justice … regain 
lost rights and solve unprecedented societal problems.   
Furthermore, a columnist in a section on women in Roze El Youssef wrote: 
 
I am aware that many male and female readers will argue that a section for men 
should also be in place. Such arguments are justified because readers and the 
public at large have been bombarded with talk about women’s rights, their 
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empowerment and their oppression over and over again by the government, 
NGOs, the international community, satellite channels, terrestrial channels, men, 
youth and women so that people are fed up with women who have attained so 
many rights and yet are still asking for more (Hassona, 2009).  
 
The quote reveals how bad the situation is; even someone who promotes women’s rights 
acknowledges that both men and women have every right to feel bad about the rights women 
have gained under the Mubarak regime.  
Things became far worse in post-Mubarak’s Egypt. The association between women’s 
rights as a whole and the former first lady became far more pronounced, and so did the 
antagonism that resulted from this association. The excerpt below is from the introductory 
paragraph of a lengthy investigative story published in Al Ahram.  
For more than 30 years persona status laws have been subjected to futile changes by 
Suzanne Mubarak that disregard religious and cultural principles … these changes have 
culminated in distorted and unacceptable reckless laws that run against religious principles and 
the holy books of non-Muslims. This dealt a blow to the stability of Egyptian families and men’s 
status in their households … and gave women [rights] that are not lawfully theirs according to 
Sharia, such as obtaining unilateral divorce through khula without reaching an agreement with 
her husband … This may be one of the reasons behind the psychological problems of a large 
segment of the Egypt[ian population] and it may be one of the indirect causes of the revolution 
against the former regime which ruined the Egyptian people’s social life and their psyche (Imam, 
2011).  
Criticism in this text is far more profound than the subtle criticism of the first lady’s role 
in decisions pertaining to women’s rights which were cited earlier. 
Headlines like this one also emerged: “The Revolution that will Change the Personal 
Status Law is Coming … El Khala [Getting Rid] of the Khula [Law]” (Imam, 2011).  
Headlines like this one also emerged: “The Revolution that will change the Personal Law 
is Coming … El Khala [Getting Rid] of the Khula [Law]” (Imam, 2011). In fact, laws pertaining 
to women that were changed or introduced under the Mubarak regime came to be referred to as 
‘Suzanne Mubarak’s laws’ (Abo El Nisr, 2012). Calls to cancel these laws altogether emerged, 
largely – but not solely – by groups like ‘Egyptian men’s Revolution’ which was established 
after the ousting of Mubarak. According to its founder, Walid Zahran, “We demand that the 
personal status law be amended … for it does not make sense that we should be governed by 
laws which were formulated and approved by the former first lady that lead to the dismantling of 
Egyptian families” (Hilal, 2012). 
It is not surprising that along with these comments, further calls to abolish NCW and 
replace it with a council for the family emerged. As a result, the women’s parliamentary quota 
was cancelled altogether and a committee to amend the khula law was formed. At the time of this 
writing, the committee was considering amending the law so that divorce by virtue of khula 
would only take place if both the wife and husband consented to it, rather than giving women the 
right to unilateral divorce (Imam, 2011).   
 
Conclusion  
When it came to decisions pertaining to women’s right, the former Egyptian regime was 
personal authoritarian with power concentrated not only around the President, as argued by 
Kassem (2004), but also around the former first lady, and to a lesser degree to their son, Gamal. 
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This also meant that the former first lady and Gamal were involved in formal politics. As 
mandated by NCW, the former first lady used to be entitled to the written powers of playing a 
role in amending and introducing laws. Yet, her formal political influence extended beyond these 
powers, since she also played a role in other decisions pertaining to women, such as appointing 
women judges.  
As portrayed by the media, decisions pertaining to women’s rights came to be associated 
with government policy and with the regime as a whole, but they became even more associated 
with the persona of the first lady because under her auspices media coverage of NCW’s activities 
was extensive and varied. Thus, in the process of analyzing the drawbacks of an authoritarian 
regime that addresses women’s rights one must take into consideration the popularity of the 
regime as a whole, the popularity of the person heading a governmental institution that is 
concerned with the rights of women. These are factors that were not identified by Murphy (2003) 
and Adams (2007).  
These factors have collectively led to societal dissent against women’s rights while 
Mubarak was still in power, reflected in both government and privately owned media. First, it led 
to the emergence of hostile comments toward women in the media. In some cases, these were 
made by men who did not seem to be against women’s rights, but ended up expressing such 
views nevertheless. Second, it led men to believe that women can only obtain rights at their 
expense, so that men have come to perceive women’s emancipation as a process in which rights 
are taken away from men and given to women; men’s power in public and in private is slowly 
eroded to the advantage of women. This in turn made it difficult to address the issue in the 
media; those who tried it later apologized. After Mubarak was ousted from power, societal 
dissent on this issue was transformed into an outright backlash against women’s rights. It 
remains to be seen whether or not the laws pertaining to women that were introduced or amended 
by the Mubarak regime will indeed be revoked. If this were to take place, the reasons behind this 
regression lay in the Mubarak era and not in post-revolutionary Egypt.  
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